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Habeas Corpus and Commitment
of the Mentally Ill
Most of the half-million patients in mental institutions in this
country today are there under the order of some judicial or admin-
istrative tribunal. The interest of the state is said to be aroused
because, in its character as parens patriae over persons of unsound
mind,1 the state has the duty to see that such persons receive the
needed care and treatment in a hospital. Or, as it is more often
expressed, the state must act in the public interest when the person
is so mentally unstable as to endanger himself and society unless
restrained.
The fact that commitment of mental patients has been con-
sidered a local matter under the federal constitution helps to
explain the lack of uniformity in procedure among the several
states. It is possible, however, to trace a general pattern of the
commitment procedures in this country.2 They are generally set
in motion by a sworn petition filed in some designated court by
persons whom the statutes may specify-near relatives, friends, or
various officials. Usually this is accompanied by a certificate that
the person is mentally ill and in need of confinement, sworn to by
one or more qualified physicians, who commonly may not be related
to the patient or connected with the institution to which it is pro-
posed to commit him. Most states require by statute that notice
of the proceedings be served on the alleged insane person, but even
without express requirement, it is said that reasonable notice must
be given.3 Methods of dispensing with notice or specifying alterna-
tive persons to be notified, such as next of kin, etc., are sometimes
provided if the tribunal is satisfied that personal service would be
ineffective or detrimental to the person's health. In a few states,
arrest on warrant can be made simultaneously with service of the
complaint, by which order the sheriff can take the patient into
custody and convey him to a named hospital, jail or court. Usually
the statutes provide that court-appointed physicians must examine
the mental condition of the person and report their findings to the
court.
Almost all states provide for a hearing by law. Usually it is
conducted before a judge or court, sometimes before a commission
'-People v. Janssen, 263 Ill. App. 101 (1931); State ex rel. Paxton v.
Guinotte, 257 Mo. 1, 165 S.W. 718 (1914); Sporza v. German Savings Bank,
192 N.Y. 8, 84 N.E. 406 (1908).
1 A summary of the statutory provisions of each state is found in Kempf,
G. A., Laws Pertaining to the Admissior of Patients to Mental Hospitals
throughout the United States (Supplement No. 157, 1939), PUBLIc HEALTH
REPoRTS.
3In re Allen, 82 Vt. 365, 73 Atl. 1078 (1909).
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in lunacy appointed by a court, or by an independent statutory
commission. Often it is held in the judge's chambers instead of in
open court. Jury trial is mandatory in two states and discretionary
in several others. The alleged defective is generally required to be
present at the hearing, nominally to enforce his right to hear the
evidence and confront his accusers. On the theory that compulsory
observance of these rights may do a mental defective more harm
than good, a minority of states allow the court discretion to proceed
without his presence. The execution of the commitment order
varies in formality from methods similar to criminal processes to
the informal procedures customary to any hospital entrance.
In almost every phase of the commitment procedure, the ob-
vious lack of uniformity points up the definite breach between
rules designed to effect traditional legal safeguards and those
planned with medical consideration for the condition of the insane
person. Although the problem of balancing these two ideals in
order to develop the perfect pattern for commitment of mentally
defective persons is an interesting and important one,4 it is not
within the scope of this comment. However, the discussion of the
use of habeas corpus must necessarily touch on the larger policy
issue at several points.
Habeas corpus has long been a recognied method of testing the
validity of a commitment on grounds of insanity.5 The writ may
be issued on one of two grounds: first, where the claim is made
that substantial irregularities not in accordance with law occurred
in the original commitment procedure,6 and second, where it is
claimed that jurisdiction over the petitioner is ended because its
basis has been removed and sanity restored, despite the refusal of
the restraining authorities to recognize the fact.7 The purpose of
this comment is to discuss these uses and their present and future
importance.
IRREGULARITIES IN THE ORIGINAL INSANITY HEARING
The list of irregularities in the original proceedings which have
been considered sufficient to enable the petitioner to succeed in
'For discussions of the problem, see Weihofen and Overholser, Commit-
nent of the Mentally Ill, 24 TEXAs L. R. 307 (1946); Analysis of Legal and
Medical Considerations in Commitment of the Mentally I1, 56 YALE; L. J. 1178
(1947).
'In re Dowdell, 169 Mass. 387, 47 N.E. 1033 (1897) ; In re Moynihan, 332
Mo. 1022, 62 S.W. 2d 410 (1933) ; In re Chace, 26 R.I. 351, 58 Atl. 978 (1904);
Byers v. Solier, 16 Wyo. 232, 93 Pac. 59 (1907).
'Supra note 5.
7 Oliver v. Terrall, 152 La. 622, 94 So. 152 (1922) ; In re Clary, 149 Calif.
732, 87 Pac. 580 (1906); People v. Hendrick, 215 N.Y. 339, 109 N:E. 486
(1915) ; In re Palmer, 26 R.I. 486, 59 AtI. 746 (1904); Schutte v. Schutte, 86
W.Va. 701, 104 S.E. 108 (1920).
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habeas corpus includes the lack of some form of the time-honored
judicial mechanisms of notice8 and hearing,9 extended detention
without judicial determination under the guise of medical exam-
ination,10 and commitments ordered, although flagrantly lacking in
proof." These defects may be in contravention of statutory or
judge-made law. In addition, the constitutionality of a statute au-
thorizing informal commitment by certification of physicians with-
out a judicial hearing may be challenged in habeas corpus. 2
However, the writ will not lie to insure a jury trial where the
state statutes do not authorize it and the right is held not to have
existed prior to the adoption of the state constitution.13 Federal
due process does not require a trial by jury in insanity hearings
because the right did not exist prior to the adoption of the Consti-
tution of the United States. 4 The writ has been denied where an
insanity hearing continued without defendant's attorney, who was
unable to attend the final day of the hearing, the court declaring
it to be an error chargeable only on appeal, and not a jurisdictional
defect or denial of a fundamental right.15 The United States Su-
preme Court has held that a person whose sanity is being tried
and who has notice but does not attend the hearing cannot col-
laterally attack the adjudication. 6
It is noted that in all these cases, the concept of the jurisdic-
tional defect as a prerequisite to maintaining the writ of habeas
corpus is strictly adhered to by the courts. While the requirement
'Ex parte Schaeffer, 177 Okla. 464, 60 P. 2d 1037 (1936); Supreme
Council v. Nicholson, 104 Md. 472, 65 Atl. 320 (1906); Joes v. Learned, 17
Colo. App. 76, 66 Pac. 1071 (1902); In re Wellman, 3 Kan. App. 100, 45 Pac.
726 (1896).
'Barry v. Hall, 98 F. 2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Ex parte Romero, 51 N.M.
205, 181 P. 2d 814 (1947); In re Boyett, 136 N.C. 415, 48 S.E. 789 (1904);
In re Allen, supra note 3; In re Lambert, 134 Calif. 626, 66 Pac. 851 (1901).
11 Allgor v. New Jersey State Hospital, 80 N.J. Eq. 386, 84 Atl. 711 (1912) ;
In re Doyle, 16 R.I. 537, 18 Atl. 159 (1889) ; In re Tharpe, 64 Vt. 398, 24 Atl.
991 (1892) ; Byers v. Solier, 16 Wyo. 232, 93 Pac. 59 (1907).
nAdmission held insufficient proof: In re Ryan, 291 Mich. 673, 289 N.W.
991 (1939); In re Phillipps, 158 Mich. 155, 122 N.W. 554 (1909). Layman's
Opinion insufficient: In re Davis, 277 Mich. 89, 268 N.W. 822 (1936). Petition
insufficient: Ex parte Nowack, 274 Mich. 544, 265 N.W. 459 (1936).
"King v. McLean Asylum, 64 Fed. 325 (1894) ; In re Lambert, 134 Calif.
626, 66 Pac. 851 (1901); State v. Kilbourne, 68 Minn. 320, 71 N.W. 396
(1897) ; Ex parte Dagley, 35 Okla. 180, 128 Pac. 699 (1912).
"State ex rel. Paxton v. Guinotte, supra note 1; Ex parte Dagley, supra
note 12; White v. White, 108 Tex. 570, 196 S.W. 508 (1917).
"Montana Co. v. St. Louis Mining & Mill Co., 152 U.S. 160 (1893) ; In re
Moynihan, supra note 5. See 91 A.L.R. 90 (1934).
"People v. Superintendent of Creedmoor State Hospital, 40 N.Y.S. 2d 84
(1943).
1 Chaloner v. Sherman, 242 U.S. 455 (1916) ; Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427
(1900).
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has been stretched until it is meaningless in criminal cases,17 the
courts continue to limit the use of the writ in insanity cases to
those in which a traditional defect of hearing or notice deprived
the original court of jurisdiction and rendered the order void; or,
phrased differently, jurisdictional defects in criminal cases ap-
parently differ from those in insanity cases.
As stated, the defects of the denial of jury trial, counsel, and
presence at hearing have come to be jurisdictional in criminal
cases. By present judicial "fair trial" tests, seemingly applicable
with equal force to civil and criminal proceedings, a person who
is mentally defective should receive the maximum of judicial pro-
tection, since he cannot help himself. Upon these bases, the courts
apparently could, if they wished, expand the concept of the juris-
dictional defect in insanity cases. It seems, therefore, that the
requirement in habeas corpus that defects be jurisdictional does
not necessarily retard the growth of judicial protection in insanity
cases. Rather, the character of the rights themselves may be dif-
ferent in the two kinds of cases.
The reason for the two sets of principles is said to be a "basic"
difference between criminal and civil or statutory proceedings, but
the mere statement of the rule does not answer the question. In
terms of the "fair trial" concept, it is possible to argue that in
the insanity hearing, a person does not need to be present or repre-
sented in order to protect his rights, since the commitment order
depends chiefly on qualified medical reports given by unbiased
officers of the court, rather than on the complicated criminal code
and recollection of past events wrung from lay witnesses. In
terms of the medical viewpoint, it is indeed better for the patient's
health if he is neither notified nor forced to attend the hearing.
These are the horns of the dilemma-legal safeguards designed
for the protection of the individual actually are dangerous to his
health. This is the point at which policy-makers must begin in
planning the perfect commitment procedure.
TREATMENT IN HABEAS CORPUS OF IRREGULARITIES
IN ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS
Since the commitment on grounds of insanity is not a final
order 18 and must be ended when sanity is recovered, some courts
hesitate to inquire into the irregularities in the original insanity
"7 See The Freedom Writ--The Expanding Use of Federal Habeas Corpus,
61 HAnv. L. R. 657, 660 (1948).
19 Carroll v. Carroll, 16 Cal. 2d 761, 108 P. 2d 420 (1936) ; In re Basset, 68
Mich. 348, 36 N.W. 97 (1888); Evans v. Johnson, 39 W.Va. 299, 19 S.E. 623
(1894).
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proceeding.19 If they find the petitioner in habeas corpus is pres-
ently sane, he can be discharged without reference to the earlier
hearing. If he is now insane, these courts refuse release, the present
adjudication reconciling the defects in the earlier hearing. While
in some measure realistic, this procedure tends to decrease the
frequency of regularized commitment and encourage a disregard
for personal liberty.
Most courts say, contrary to the above view, that the original
proceeding is void, but because of the petitioner's present inca-
pacity, he can be temporarily restrained, pending a new and regu-
lar hearing.20 Although this view adds another case to busy court
calendars and increases the expense to the state, it is probably
warranted by its inherent justice and tendency toward systema-
tizing the procedure.
HABEAS CORPUS UPON RECOVERY OF SANITY
As previously stated, confinement of a person on grounds of
insanity is valid only until he recovers his mental health.21 Peri-
odic re-examination of patients and release procedures are usually
provided by statute.2 2 But there is no appeal from the decision of
the release authorities as of right,23 and generally, none is given
by statute, nor can the original case be reopened on the grounds
of recovery of sanity.2 4 Consequently, habeas corpus would seem
to be the only, and therefore a necessary, means of reviewing these
decisions.
As in other areas where the writ of habeas corpus is applica-
ble, the requirement of exhausting the available statutory reme-
dies as a prerequisite to obtaining the writ is applied with varying
strictness in different courts.2 In Ohio, habeas corpus appears to
be an unqualified alternative to the statutory remedy.2 6
From the medical viewpoint, however, this use of habeas corpus
"Barbee v. Kolb, 207 Ark. 227, 179 S.W. 2d 701 (1944) ; King v. McLean
Asylum, 64 Fed. 331 (1894); People v. Chanler, 196 N.Y. 525, 89 N.E. 1109
(1909); Gresh's Case, 12 Pa. Co. 295 (1892); In re Palmer, 26 R.I. 486, 59
Atl. 746 (1904).
-Barry v. Hall, supra note 9; Ex parte Romero, supra note 9; In re Boyett,
supra note 9; In re Allen, supra note 3; Ex parte Schaeffer, supra note 8;
In re Moynihan, supre note 5.
-Northfoss v. Welch, 116 Minn. 62, 133 N.W. 82 (1911).
22E.g., OHio GEN. CODE §1890-63 (1938).
'In re Cash, 383 Ill. 409, 50 N.E. 2d 487 (1943) ; In re Cook, 218 N.C. 384,
11 S.E. 2d 142 (1940).
21 State v. Linderholm, 95 Kan. 669, 149 Pac. 427 (1915).
1 In re Ryan, 47 F. Supp. 1023 (Pa. 1942) ; In re Rainbolt, 64 Colo. 581,
172 Pac. 1068 (1918); Hamilton v. Henderson, 232 Mo. App. 1204, 117 S.W.
2d 379 (1938). Contra: Byers v. Solier, supra note 5.
1 Yankulov v. Bushong, 80 Ohio App. 497, 77 N.E. 2d 88 (1945).
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has undesirable elements. The impecunious petitioner seeking evi-
dence to support his claim of recovered health must turn to state
medical authorities, who may be suspected of bias because of their
additional role as defendants. To give such a petitioner an inde-
pendent resource, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
has extended the opportunity of opinion by a court-appointed phy-
sician. 7 Even more difficult is the situation caused by having the
hospital doctors appear against the petitioner under the adverse
circumstances of the habeas corpus hearing. Medical men call it
extremely undesirable, since is destroys the physician-patient rela-
tionship so necessary to further aid in the patient's recovery. 2
TREATMENT OF THE PRESENT SANITY ISSUE
In most jurisdictions, the court in habeas corpus has the au-
thority to render a direct decision as to the petitioner's sanity in
either of the two uses of the writ29 Contrary to this procedure,
the courts of the District of Columbia will not render this decision,
but only treat the writ of habeas corpus as a means of initiating
action for re-examination of the petitioner by the statutory release
authorities.3 0 This view is apparently based on the theory that the
court is not as capable of rendering a decision on sanity as are the
experts comprising the release authority. A great burden of habeas
corpus cases in the District of Columbia in recent years may have
played a greater part in the holding. It may be pointed out that
under this view, the petitioner does not have the same opportunity
for independent decision that he has under the majority rule, and
while the judges are not medically qualified, they can seek expert
help in the habeas corpus action as well as in any other.
CONCLUSION
As a means of independent relief, habeas corpus is serving a
useful purpose in the present legal machinery of the insanity com-
mitment. Moreover, if the medical viewpoint succeeds in influenc-
ing changes in the commitment procedure which eliminate some
present legal safeguards, habeas corpus will increase in impor-
tance as an ultimate safeguard.
Nevertheless, there are weaknesses in the form of this relief.
Since the writ is only a collateral attack on the commitment order,
'De Marcos v. Overholser, 137 F. 2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
Weihofen and Overholser, supvra note 4, at 335.
In re Ryrnan, 139 Pa. Super. 212, 11 A. 2d 677 (1940) ; In re Buchanan,
129 Calif. 330, 61 Pac. 1120 (1900); People ex rel. Peabody v. Chandler, 196
N.Y. 525, 89 N.E. 1109 (1907); Northfoss v. Welch, supra, note 21.
'Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F. 2d 857 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Barry v. Hall, supra,
note 9.
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it will never be the complete remedy for an improper adjudication
of insanity. In addition, even if granted, it does not wipe the bad
adjudication from the records. Medical men would minimize this,
calling it only a record of treatment but failing to consider public
reaction to the proceedings, as well as the continued evidentiary
use of the adjudication in other cases in which the person's sanity
might be in issue.
As an alternative to habeas corpus, the petitioner may seek to
have the commitment order set aside. Since the jurisdiction of the
committing court generally continues until the patient has re-
covered mental health,81 this court has a continuing power to cor-
rect errors in its proceedings, 32 except to the extent that the
doctrine of laches operates. 33 The grounds for setting aside a com-
mitment order include not only the substantial irregularities
recognized in the habeas corpus action but all errors generally
remediable by appeal.34 Although this remedy lacks some of the
independent and continuing nature of habeas corpus, it is a more
complete relief to this extent. Consequently, it might be desirable
to expand it to replace the existing remedy of habeas corpus.
Bvjce W. Kendall
Heckman v. Adams, 50 Ohio St. 305, 34 N.E. 155 (1893).
'Bliss v. Bliss, 133 Md. 61, 104 Atl. 467 (1918) ; In re Weaver, 116 Pa. 225,
9 Atl. 323 (1887) ; Hamilton v. Henderson, supra, note 25.
'Shafer v. Shafer, 181 Ind. 244, 104 N.E. 507 (1914) ; Coot v. Willett, 93
Mich. 304, 53 N.W. 395 (1892).
"44 C.J.S., INSANE PERSONS, 85 (1945).
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